Preface & Chapter 1 of Andrew Feenberg's Questioning Technology

I'd initially planned to post one response to Feenberg's book, but when I got into it, I realized I'd never be able to synthesize all his arguments or all my questions/misunderstandings regarding his work in one concise response. So, I'll do this in stages instead and will have a summation post when I finish the book that will be more of my response to the text rather than a summation of the entire book. Hope this is okay.

I. Primary Question
What is our relationship to technology? Is technology, as Heidegger and others claim, an autonomous force existing outside the influence of humans? Or is it a social and political construct that is completely (?) conceived, developed, and manipulated by the culture in which it is created?

II. Project of these chapter's/overall aim
The Preface and first chapter of Andrew Feenberg's Questioning Technology seem to be setting up a tension between two opposing viewpoints of technology--one that views technology as autonomous, (as in Heidegger and Habermas's conception of it) existing outside the realm and influence of human control, and another that views technology as socially mitigated. Feenberg positions himself early on within the camp of those viewing technology as something bound up in the social, arguing that we must conceive of technology as a social and political element in order to be able to control it rather than be controlled by it (and those who have created it).

Feenberg argues that "insofar as we continue to see the technical and the social as separate domains, important aspects of these dimensions of our existence will remain beyond our reach as a democratic society. The fate of democracy is therefore bound up with our understanding of technology. The purpose of this book is to think that vital connection" (vii). Feenberg sees a social conception of technology as central to our ability to control it, to shape it in ways that will benefit a larger sector of society. Feenberg continues by claiming that "real change will come not when we turn away from technology toward meaning, but when we recognize the nature of our subordinate position in the technical systems that enroll us, and begin to intervene in the design process in the defense of the conditions of a meaningful life and a livable environment" (xiv). Until we recognize technology as socially constructed, we will be ruled by it. When we finally see technology as nothing more than something created by other people (not existed, all powerful, on its own), then we will be able to manipulate it and make it work for our own ends.

III. Rhetorical Moves and Major Arguments
The main goal of the Preface and Chapter one seems to be to outline recent and current theory regarding human's relationship to technology. Feenberg begins by moving through a conception of technology as neutral calling this "common sense instrumentalism" claiming that those who conceived of technology as "neutral" thought that it required no additional thought or consideration. Obviously, the world of technological theory sees technology in much different terms, and Feenberg quickly moves on to discussing what he calls the "progressivism" trend which viewed any progress in technology as progress for humankind saying that "technical progress was believed to ground humanity's advance toward freedom and happiness" (2). This view of technology seems to be grounded still in a rather innocent conception of technology. That is, the "advancement" of technology doesn't have political or ideological implications. However, what Feenberg terms "substantive" theorists--the class to which Heidegger belongs (as Feenberg claims, anyway)--"argue that technology is not neutral but embodies specific values. Its spread is therefore not innocent. The tools we use shape our way of life in modern societies where technique has become all pervasive. In this situation, means and ends cannot be separated. How we do things determines who and what we are. Technological development transforms what it is to be human" (2). But, according to Feenberg, this conception is still not socially mitigated. Technology acts on its own accord to influence man, and unless we understand that, we will never be able to work alongside it rather than constantly being manipulated by it.

Feenberg moves to discussing constructivist theory of technology which "focuses on the social alliances that lie behind technical choices. Each configuration of components corresponds not only to a technical logic, but also to the social logic of its selection. A wide variety of social groups count as actors in technical development" (10). Constructivists, Feenberg further argues, claim "that many paths lead out from the first forms of a new technology. Some are well-trodden while others are quickly deserted. The 'principle of symmetry' holds that there are always viable technical alternatives that might have been developed in place of the successful one. The difference lies not so much in the superior efficiency of the successful designs, as in a variety of local circumstances that differentiate otherwise comparable artifacts" (10). Technological advances, in other words, are determined not by one path's inherent superiority over another (as it, it's inherently better to insulate the spacecraft with foam panels rather than aerogel cells) but rather the social interactions that go on behind the creation of such technologies (as in, this congressman is able to persuasively acquire more money for his foam industry than another is his aerogel industry...thanks to Derek for working at NASA!).

Feenberg concludes his first chapter by taking a stance (presumably the stance around which the book will be focused) arguing that "the design and configuration of technology does more than merely accomplish our ends; it also organizes society and subordinates its members to a technocratic order. Only by including technology in the media theory can we arrive at an adequate account of what Habermas calls the 'technization' of the 'lifeworld'" (17). He goes on to say that his theory concerning technology "attempts to embrace the wide variety of ways in which technology engages with its objects, its subjects, and its environment. A social account of the essence of technology enlarges democratic concerns to encompass the technical dimension of our lives. It offers an alternative to both the ongoing celebration of technology triumphant and the gloomy Heideggerian prediction of technocultural disaster" (17). In a sense, Feenberg seems to be doing the same kind of work Heidegger was doing in "The Question Concerning Technology." That is, he seems to be investigating our relationship with technology with the ultimate goal of learning to manipulate technology rather than end up being manipulated by it instead. But his understanding of technology's power within society is vastly different (I think) from Heidegger's understanding of it. The two, I would say, are diametrically opposed. Where Heidegger seems to argue (I think) that technology is a force acting upon humankind, Feenberg seems to be arguing (again, I think) that we have the potential to be the force that controls technology.

Michel Foucault's "Power/Knowledge"

Foucault's main purpose in writing these pieces seems to be to attempt to investigate no only what power is but also how it is manifest through society by looking at various points in history to uncover the execution/manipulation of power. He discusses different conceptions of power at length and sets up a binary between the idea that power functions only to control or police the masses and that of power as a living organism that weaves a path through society. He claims:

Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application. (98)

Foucault fights back against the notion that power is something possessed by only a few and exerted on many. In fact, he seems to be arguing that power is distributed much more broadly (though he does admit it's not equally distributed), and that those in "power" are only in that privileged position because the masses allow it. Throughout this book, Foucault seems to be asking his readers to reformulate their thinking on power, pushing them to perhaps rise up and seize the power he argues they already possess.

As a collection of his work, this book builds its argument from chapter to chapter by dealing with different aspects of history and society to demonstrate how power is manifest/present in each.
Foucault begins with a discussion concerning popular justice and argues the regulating nature of any official court will inherently work against the goals of a popular uprising. He points out, for instance, that

In all the great uprisings since the fourteenth century the judicial officials have regularly been attacked, on the same grounds as have tax officials, and more generally those who exercise power: the prisons have been opened, the judges thrown out and the courts closed down. Popular justice recognises in the judicial system a state apparatus, representative of public authority, and instrument of class power. (6)

Foucault goes to examine the purpose of penal systems and argues that the goal of prisons is not, as many believe it is, to reform criminals. Rather, he argues that prisons are very good at breeding new criminals, criminals who will reinforce the popular need for the police. As Foucault says, without criminals there would be no police. Foucault ends this discussion by pointing out that the judicial system is also responsible for withholding knowledge from the masses and that in many cases of popular justice, the information held within official coffers is frequently disseminated to the masses. This is significant because Foucault believes that knowledge and power are very closely tied together. He argues that "knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power; this is just a way of reviving humanism in a utopian guise. It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power" (52). Though he never really expands on it, he seems to be implying some of the government's methods for controlling the masses (namely, prisons and the penal system) work to purposefully limit the amount of knowledge that is available to the masses. Without this knowledge, the masses can never have as much power as those who regularly exercise official power. Knowledge is key.

Foucault's key purpose in this book, especially as seen in the last few excerpts included here, seems to be to reformulate our conception of power, of the way we look at and examine power. Many, Foucault argues, look at power as something that limits what people can do--something that says "no"--but he calls us to consider power in other terms. He argues

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (119)

In other words, though he's spent much of the works included in this book critically investigating those who exercise power--picking apart their motives and techniques as something presumably "bad"--he's asking us to consider the productive aspects of power...what it has the potential to acheive. Additionally, he argues that instead of merely looking at those who already have power and they way execute it, we should also consider the means by which they came to have that power. Who put them there? How the did the system that empowers them come to be? Understanding this, he seems to claim, will help us understand the roots of power.

Much of what Foucault is discussing in this book seems central to what we're trying to do in composition classes. That is, we teach students to write to a particular audience for a particular end. We teach them to use language to persuade readers to buy into their argument. We teach students to better understand their audience's expectations/needs so that they can be more effective in persuading those particular people that their argument is sound. All of this seems centrally connected to Foucault's conception of power...both how one gains power as well as how one executes it. We're trying to breed critical consciousness in our students so that they can go forward and, we hope, make the world a better place. We're trying to enstill power in them by giving them a working knowledge of how people communicate to persuade one another. Theoretically, I see the connection, but beyond this, I'm not really sure Foucault's work directly relates to the composition class. Rather, it seems his work can be related to the critical work the field is doing in developing composition classes that will empower. It seems that Foucault's works ask us, those studying rhetoric and composition, to do the work behind the scenes to better understand how power is working in our society so that we can then pass on this knowledge to our students.

As I read through this book, I made several comments relating Foucault's work here with the digital age. He speaks of knowledge as central to having power, and I wonder how the Internet--as a global communication and knowledge dissemination device--has changed the hierarchical power structures of society. I'm reminded of the Tibetian monk uprising in March of 2008 when the government restricted access to telephones and the Internet. I was horrified then that the government had the power to effectively cut off its citizens from the rest of the world, as after reading Foucault, I guess I'm no longer surprised the government would respond the way they did. Cutting Internet access prevented those in Tibet from contacting the rest of the world. Whereas the current protests in Iran are on phenomenon. To my knowledge (though sadly, people aren't talking about this anymore), the government never effectively cut Internet access, and consequently, videos of protests have been posted to Youtube that have drawn the attention of the rest of the world. It seems wide-spread communication tools have given more people power, but on the other hand, I can't help but wonder about those people who are completely removed from the digital era. Be it people who don't have access to the Internet b/c of economic reasons or those simply not "into" the Internet, they can't have the same perspective on global issues nor can they fully engage with the conversation that's going on and are consequently disempowered.

As to Foucault's theory that power is in everybody, that it's not centralized in one sector over another, I'm not sure I buy it. I'm thinking of all the times people have been exploited--all people who suffered in slavery, those who are bound a system they can seem to get out of (women, african americans, the dependent class), etc.--and have a hard time believing that they willingly handed over power to those in charge. I think there's a lot of hope in what Foucault is saying because if everybody has a hand in the way the world is run, then everybody has a chance to change the world. But I think something he's not considering are the stakes different people have. Poor people have to work, and if it means they're being exploited in order to feed their family, then they'll continue to do it until their bodies break or the system no longer gives them what they need to survive. I was disappointed in reading Foucault's discussion of popular justice because of this. He talks a lot about what happens when a popular uprising occurs, but he doesn't really discuss what causes those uprisings...what is it that finally gets people angry enough to stand up, despite what they have to lose, and demand a change. Exploring this more may have convinced me that power is, in fact, distributed throughout society. I certainly don't deny a certain amount of power is inherent in mostly everybody, but I don't think it's as easy for some to exercise that power as it is for others.

The Question Concerning Technology

What is Heidegger attempting to accomplish through writing “The Question Concerning Technology”?

Heidegger’s main purpose in this text seems to be to get his readers thinking much more critically about the ways technology works to define and manipulate its users. He argues that unless we slow down and question technology we will become passive users of it. He says:

Thus we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we merely conceive and push forward the technological, put up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral. (4)

Actually, as I reread this quote, it seems that he’s not only questioning technology, but he’s questioning our relationship with it. He’s also striving in this piece to redefine what technology is by merging the two conceptions of technology as (1) “a means to an end” and (2) a “human activity” (4). Heidegger views defining technology as a central question in his piece claiming that viewing technology as a non-neutral instrument through which humans acquire ends will allow us to manipulate technology as a means rather than becoming passively manipulated users of it.

What are the major points of Heidegger’s argument as he works toward his end?

Heidegger begins by centralizing the question concerning technology as one of defining what technology is and what relationship humans have to it. He claims the two distinct definitions of technology – a means to an end and a human activity – belong together because the manipulation of our surroundings to suit our needs is, in fact, a human activity. Heidegger sees technology as humans developing tools to manipulate their surroundings in order to meet an end (4-5). Technology is, in other words, merely an instrument developed and used by humans. Nothing more. Heidegger makes connections between “old” technology (weather vane, sawmill) and “modern” technology (power plant, jet aircraft, radar, hydroelectric plants) claiming that, though modern technology is more advanced, the essence behind it is basically the same. Both old and new technologies were tools developed for the purpose of harnessing something within nature. Heidegger claims that understanding all technology as a means to an end is central in maintaining the “proper” relationship with it. That is, we must work to master it rather than being mastered by it (5).

In order to touch upon the causality of technology, Heidegger expands upon the four causes provided by philosophy: the material, the shape into which the material enters, the end, and that which brings about the end (6). He demonstrates the different causes by using a silver challis as an example—that is, the four causes that bring about the silver challis. The material cause consider what the end is made of. In the case of a silver challis, the end is made of silver. The shape of a silver challis is predetermined. The end cause for the silver challis is the religious background from which the conception of the challis sprung (its purpose, form, and function). And finally, that which brings about the challis would be the silversmith. Heidegger goes on, however, to question whether the conception of the four causes is accurate claiming that, in fact, the four causes are closely bound and affected by one another (7-9). Heidegger claims the four causes are at play in “bringing-forth” (11). That is, nature reveals itself through the action of these four causes. “Bringing-forth brings hither out of concealment forth into unconcealment. Bring-forth comes to pass only insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment” (11). What is unconcealed, Heidegger claims, is “truth.” Though he does not make the outright claim, Heidegger seems to be pointing to a foundational truth here—claiming that the bringing-forth of the four causes will bring about the revealing of a Truth. Heidegger draws the conversation back to technology by claiming that “technology is a way of revealing” (12).

Extending his argument as it relates specifically to modern technology (which he seems to define as that which draws upon exact science, Physics) claiming that it is different from older technologies in that “the revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such” (14). Through man’s manipulation of modern technologies, the earth reveals itself to be various things—a mineral deposit or coal mining district.

I certainly see the logic here, however, I tempted to disagree with Heidegger that older technologies did not harness the earth’s energy. If we look at the three “basic machines”—the inclined plane, the lever, and the wheel—we see they all manipulate energy—physical energy—in some way that allows humans to go beyond their natural abilities. Maybe I’m reading Heidegger too literally. Perhaps he’s more concerned with the exploitation of Earth’s resources more than he is with philosophizing about human’s manipulation of the laws of nature. Because certainly the older technologies drew on energies provided by the earth, but the newer technologies have worked to own the energy provided by the earth – commodifying it – rather than simply use it as needed. Perhaps this is where Heidegger senses something amiss.

Heidegger goes on to discuss technology as a standing-reserve (17). That is, “it has its standing only from the ordering of the orderable” and has no power of its own (17). The same can be said, Heidegger claims, for humans who are challenged, ordered, to draw forth the energies of the earth. However, since humans have a shaping power in technology, they are not merely part of the standing-reserve, but I think Heidegger is claiming they can be if they are passively using technology. Heidegger claims that “man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens and hears, and not only one who is constrained to obey” (25). In other words, in order to prevent becoming one in the standing-reserve who is merely called upon (as technology is) to manipulate nature and bring forth stored energies, humans must actively respond to technology, the driving force behind technology, and that which is influenced/affected by technology. Heidegger concludes by arguing that as long as we view technology as an instrument—merely a means to an end, we will always be relegated to the task of mastering it thus becoming ourselves part of the standing-reserve. However, when we question “how the instrumental comes to presence as a kind of causality” then we will become active users who will have a more direct hand in shaping and using technology (32).

How does this work relate to the Composition Class?

As technology, digital computerized technology specifically, becomes more central in everyday life, it seems learning to “master” technology goes hand in hand with being successful in the world. Though it was written sixty years ago, this piece is still highly relevant today, perhaps more so than it was in 1949. Students would benefit from a new conception of technology as it functions within their lives considering for instance what the Internet reveals about humans. Heidegger doesn’t really go into it much, but considering the political revealing of today’s technology would also be highly beneficial for students—especially students who may not have as much access to some of the most “basic” technologies. If we consider computers as revealing something inherent about those who had a hand in creating them, we might draw really interesting conclusions. For instance, if we were to consider that most software marketed in the US privileges standard English, we might draw surprising conclusions about who created the software and who they envisioned using the software. I think it’s been said many times since Heidegger published this piece, but passing on a critical consciousness regarding technology’s influence in our lives today seems central to a student’s success in the world—both as they move to use technology as it is typically used by those in power but also as the move to manipulate technology, to bend it to the user’s will rather than visa versa. As Heidegger says, technology is not neutral, and passing on this conception of technology would do a lot to demystify it and make it a much more visible thing.

Questions I had while reading this text

My initial reading of this text brought up many questions, but I found that two were at the heart of my understanding what Heidegger was trying to achieve through writing this text.

First, when Heidegger discusses technology, what is he talking about? When I first read this text, I grew increasingly frustrated that he didn’t nail down what kind of “technology” he was addressing. My second reading revealed that this was one of his central questions, hence why he didn’t define it outright. But as I think about technology as a bringing-forth—“bringing-forth brings hither out of concealment forth into unconcealment. Bring-forth comes to pass only insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment” (11)—I wonder if any manipulation of nature counts as technology. Language, for instance. Not the words written on a scroll or typed on a computer screen, but merely spoken language. We’re manipulating air to produce sounds that other humans will recognize and understand. The development of such communicative tools reveals something about the nature of humans—our need, for instance, to connect on some level with others. Does this count as technology in Heidegger’s estimation?

Heidegger states several times that the essence of technology is that it is a revealing, and my second big question concerns what it reveals. Again, as this is one of his central questions, perhaps this is why he doesn’t answer what technology reveals. Perhaps this would be contrary to his goal of making his readers more consciously aware of how technology (broadly defined) reflects upon nature and humans. He discusses how technology that draws upon energy resources can reflect upon humans, but he doesn’t expand on this. He seems to be hinting that humans are bad for wanting to exploit the natural reserves of the Earth, but he never comes out and says that directly. But if technology is a revealing, then what does it reveal? Is this question meant to be answered in a case-by-case basis? Or there an overarching revealing that can be discussed?